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Introduction 
Australia is one of the world’s major immigrant destinations, attracting settlers, 
labour migrants, students and refugees who, by and large, have successfully inte­
grated into the country’s economic and social fabric. From the early days of its 
European settlement, this island-continent has embraced large-scale immigra­
tion as an imperative of population growth and a development opportunity. This 
migration-based growth potential was to be realised in a controlled and selective 
manner through a comprehensive migration governance regime combining evolv­
ing immigration strategies, policies and procedures. Favouring particular catego­
ries of newcomers while discouraging others and a commitment to the smooth 
integration of new arrivals into the country’s socio-economic fabric have been the 
dominant features of Australia’s immigration policy. 
Temporary and permanent migration streams provide two major entry points 
for different categories of newcomer to enter Australia. As of early 2019, the cur­
rent, unmet annual cap on permanent immigration is fixed at 190,000 (propor­
tionally about three times the US rate of annual admissions), although there are 
political pressures to reduce this intake to 160,000. Nevertheless, even if the cap 
is reduced well below the current target figure, pro rata, given its total population 
of 25 million, Australia remains one of the most immigrant-welcoming societies 
in the world. 
This hospitable approach, however, has been restricted to those migrants who 
seek and are granted formal (authorised) visa entry into the country. In contrast, 
Australia applies a very harsh regime of border controls by refusing entry and 
reticulating to offshore detention centres all entry-seekers whom it regards as 
unauthorised and illegal. As a result, despite its enviable record of immigrant 
acceptance and assimilation and refugee assistance, Australia has attracted a great 
deal of international opprobrium as a country that turns away boatloads of asylum-
seekers and detains unauthorised boat arrivals in offshore confinement facilities 
to stop them applying for asylum and to deter mass inflows of asylum-seekers. 
Since 1945, about 7 million immigrants have come to Australia; as a result, 
about one in four Australian residents has been born overseas and nearly half 
of the population have at least one parent born overseas. Immigration keeps the 
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population growing at over 1.5 per cent per annum, lowers its aging rate and 
contributes 0.5–1.0 per cent to the long-term annual GDP growth rate of about 3 
per cent (PC 2016). A modelling commissioned in the mid-2010s by the Migra­
tion Council of Australia1 shows the likely increase in GDP per capita attributed 
to immigration at roughly the present rate to be nearly 6 per cent by 2050 (MCA
2015). While apparently modest, the figure implies that immigrants, in their total­
ity, not only pay their way as new community members but also enhance the 
wellbeing of the existing population. 
For much of its history, Australia’s immigration strategy has been framed as 
its de facto population policy, at times elevated to a ‘populate-or-perish’ policy 
imperative. This is not surprising given the country’s geographic isolation as a 
remote island-continent inhabited by a relatively small population of largely Euro­
pean origin, spread along the southern edge of the land mass and mostly confined 
to a few, large urban agglomerations. The vast, inhospitable and arid interior, the 
lack of fresh water and the extreme weather conditions have always proven a con­
straint on the scale of human settlement in Australia. This explains why the First 
Australians – the original inhabitants who settled in Australia some 50,000 years 
ago and numbered some 750,000 people in the late-eighteenth century –
have lived mostly a nomadic existence and have been dispersed over large land 
areas, lacking the capacity to resist more effectively the relatively late and initially 
modest European colonisation of the continent. This also explains why, for the 
first 150 years of European settlement of Australia, border controls were largely 
absent (Withers 2016). The geographic remoteness of the continent and its harsh 
environment provide a degree of natural protection – before the advent of cheap 
intercontinental air travel, the notorious ‘tyranny of distance’ and the associated 
high cost and long duration of sea voyages had deterred many potential European 
settlers. 
Historically, Australia has evolved over its 200 years of European settlement 
from a cluster of British colonies at the far end of the British Empire into a modern 
federal entity in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite its focus on primary industries, 
the region is able to support high levels of socio-economic development and pro­
vide superior living standards for its residents, combined with effective national 
security, stable liberal-democratic political regimes embedded in British parlia­
mentary and legal traditions and a generally friendly and tolerant multi-ethnic 
population. Not surprisingly, Australia has become one of the world’s favourite 
migrant destinations, with a long history of government-sponsored immigration 
underpinned by easy pathways to residence and naturalisation. 
The successful migrant integration has often been attributed to the policy of 
multiculturalism, which encourages ‘migrants’, especially those from non-Anglo-
Saxon background, to retain and cultivate their distinct ethnic identity (Pakulski 
2014). This policy of mutual tolerance and acceptance of diversity was intended 
to accelerate the two-way dynamics of social integration between ‘migrants’ and 
‘locals’. However, the efficacy of this policy has recently been questioned, as con­
cerns for the social cohesion, adaptability and employability of different migrant 
groups have dulled the appetite for high levels of ethnic and cultural diversity. 
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Additionally, the policy of social integration has been far less effective in relation 
to the country’s Indigenous population – some 800,000 people or about 3 per cent 
of the Australian population claim Indigenous ancestry – who often feel resentful 
towards the country’s history of accelerated immigrant settlement and see them­
selves as the dispossessed victims of European colonialism. For a long time, too, 
successive Australian immigration policies have marginalised Pacific Islanders –
those inhabiting small island states in Australia’s vast maritime neighbourhood –
who critically depend on opportunities offered by Australia and New Zealand for 
their economic wellbeing. 
Inevitably, all forms of migration governance, even those generally regarded 
as highly successful, have their particular failings and unintended moral hazards 
(perverse responses to policy incentives) that partially offset their otherwise sub­
stantial accomplishments. It is therefore instructive to consider both the declared 
drivers of success and the apparent causes of failure. From the perspective of 
this book, the Australian migration governance experience is interesting for three 
reasons: 
•  the evolving history of immigration and integration strategies, policies and 
procedures has been a rich source of positive and negative lessons for other 
countries. The lessons cover such diverse policy options as the controversial 
White Australia policy, government-sponsored immigration, the progressive 
opening of the country to immigrants from Southern Europe, East Asia and 
now all parts of the world, the policy of multicultural integration of immi­
grants and the controversial policy of offshore detention and reticulation of 
unauthorised immigrants (the so-called Pacific Solution); 
•  the progressive transformation of the traditional settler immigration scheme 
into the competitive sourcing of human and social capital through a two-step 
programme of temporary work permits and educational opportunities (based 
on ‘merit points’) which subsequently funnels short-term migrants into the 
pool of permanent immigrants and naturalised citizens (Withers 2016); and 
•  the ‘idiorhythmic’ regional migration governance of Australia has been an 
interesting, albeit only emerging, alternative to the top-down, centralised EU 
model of migration governance (Chand and Markowski 2018). 
Consequently, the present chapter focuses on: 
•  the history of Australian immigration strategies, policies and procedures and, 
especially, their evolution from the country’s early commitment to selec­
tive European settlement under the White Australia policy to the present-
day focus on a large-scale and increasingly competitive immigration regime 
aimed at attracting to Australia globally footloose skilled labour as well as 
the human, social and cultural capital needed to keep the country in the first 
division of the world’s most prosperous nations; 
•  the effectiveness of the current migration policy, in particular as a means of 
funneling temporary, mostly skilled, labour migrants and foreign students 
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into permanent residents and citizens, and their subsequent integration into 
the social and cultural fabric of Australia; 
•  the moral hazards and adverse selection problems posed by different migra­
tion policy options; 
•  the challenges associated with Australia’s broader engagement in regional 
migration governance; and 
•  the lessons to be drawn from the Australian experience for member-states of 
the European Union. 
Historic overview 
‘Australia is a nation of immigrants’ declared the Committee for Economic
Development of Australia in its 2016 assessment of the economic costs and
benefits of Australia’s in-bound migration (Taylor 2016: 14). As the population
of the First Australians was small, nomadic and dispersed over a vast land mass,
Captain Cook – who claimed possession of the eastern part of the mainland for
the British Crown in 1770 – declared the continent to be an uninhabited terri­
tory (terra nullius) ready to attract settlers and explorers. The perception of Aus­
tralia as a nation of immigrants began with the arrival of the British First Fleet in
1788, followed by an influx of about 10 million settlers, with 70 per cent of them
arriving after 1947 (CEDA 2016: 6). During the colonial period (1788–1900),
immigrants came to Australia as British transported convicts or as beneficiaries of
(British) subsidised- or assisted-passage schemes as well as self-funded, mostly
European, free settlers (PC 2016).2 
In 1901, when the former British colonies federated to form the Commonwealth 
of Australia, the share of those Australia-born in the total resident population was 
about 77 per cent. By 1905, the resident population numbered 4 million, increas­
ing to 6 million by the 1929 Great Depression. Between 1905 and 1929, a further 
700,000 new settlers arrived in Australia, mostly from the United Kingdom, of 
whom many were subsidised under the assisted-passage arrangements. After the 
Great Depression and until the end of the Second World War the rate of annual net 
overseas migration to Australia was negligible (PC 2016). Thus, by 1947, the ratio 
of the Australia-born in the total population increased to 90 per cent and it took the 
following 70 years to lower it again to about 72 per cent in 2015. Not surprisingly, 
in its 2016 overview of the significance of mass immigration for the Australian 
economy and society, the Productivity Commission – a government think-tank 
assisting with policy evaluation – opined that ‘Australia’s immigration policy is 
its de facto population policy’ (PC 2016: 3). 
That said, from the very beginning of the British settlement of Australia, the
nature of immigration that should drive population increase has been hotly con­
tested. While the early settlement was underpinned by shipments of convict labour
from the United Kingdom, by the early 1840s, grassroots opposition to convict
transportation had sprung up throughout Eastern Australia with the Australasian
Anti-Transportation League, formed in 1851 (Creighton 2019).3 As the Sydney
Morning Herald proclaimed in 1850, not to end the transportation of convicts
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would condemn Australia to ‘the scorn of mankind as the willing – the abject –
the self-polluted receptacle and home of felons and criminals of every hideous
class, grade and order of depravity’ (cited in Creighton 2019). This passionate
opposition to further convict arrivals followed the then-British government’s
intention to revive their transportation to New South Wales (NSW) which had
been suspended in 1840.4 Arguably, this populist, anti-convict sentiment was the
earliest attempt to influence the selectivity of the Australian immigration strategy.
However, the strong anti-convict sentiment of the free settlers largely ignored
the economic fundamentals of Australian colonial existence, where much of the
early labour was provided by convicts and emancipists (freed or pardoned former
convicts). Not surprisingly, rich squatters favoured continued convict transporta­
tion as a source of cheap labour, although some were willing to compromise and
establish a strict ratio (say, one in three) of transported convicts to free-settler
arrivals (Creighton 2019). 
This polarisation of settler sentiment also had its roots in the deep layer of 
social antipathy between the two ‘founding ethnicities’ of Australian colonies: the 
economically dominant Anglo-Scottish and mostly Protestant ‘upper class’ of big 
farmers, graziers, merchants and professionals, and the Irish-Catholic ‘working 
class’ of labourers, tradesmen and small farmers (Goldlust 2009).5 By the late-
nineteenth century, the latter group became dominant and gave much of its cul­
tural identity to the emergent Australian nation – in particular, its strong sense of 
‘mateship’ and egalitarianism, its ethos of social fairness and its firm resentment 
of the dominance and privileges of the Anglophilic elite (Goldlust 2009). Argu­
ably, it is this increasingly middle core of Australian society rather than its ‘upper 
class’ priviligentsia that has mostly shaped the subsequent 100 years of Austral­
ian politics, and, thus, the changing social and political attitudes to new cohorts 
of immigrant settlers and the immigration strategies, policies and procedures of 
the emerging federation of Australian colonies. On the other hand, despite the 
undercurrent of tension between the two ‘founding ethnicities’, the social identity 
of the new federal state had been overwhelmingly ‘British Imperial’. Until 1948, 
when the passing of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cwlth) introduced 
Australian citizenship, Australians could only hold the status of British subjects 
(PC 2016). Thus, well into the late 1950s, 
The maps of the world on every schoolroom wall (in Australia) showed in 
vivid red the Empire on which the sun never set. Empire Day for most was 
celebrated as a sacred occasion; Australia Day by contrast was a secular 
picnic. . . . 
In Australia, unlike Britain, at the beginning or end of most public occa­
sions, concerts, plays, films, dances, even sporting finals, the ‘National 
Anthem’, namely ‘God Save the King’ or ‘God Save the Queen’, was played 
and everyone stood to show respect for the crowned symbol of the British 
peoples. The first visit of a reigning monarch to Australia in 1954 was an 
unparalleled quasi-religious national event which brought huge crowds of 
people into the streets to pay homage to the one whom the Sydney Morning 
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Herald declared was the symbol of ‘the supreme achievement of the British 
race’. 
As late as 1947, 65 per cent of Australians, when asked in a public opinion 
poll whether they wished to have British or Australian nationality, opted for 
being British. 
(Meany 2013: 26) 
Not surprisingly, the scale and composition of non-British immigration emerged 
as a major issue during the first election campaign of the newly formed Australian 
Federation. The Immigration Restriction Act (Cwlth) was passed in 1901 (Taylor 
2016), restricting opportunities for people of non-European ethnicity to settle in 
Australia by demanding that they pass a written ‘dictation test’ in any European 
language of an examining customs official’s choosing (PC 2016). In 1905, the 
Act was amended to allow for a dictation test in any language at all.6 These two 
Acts which, together with the Naturalisation Act 1903 (Cwlth), precluded people 
from Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands from seeking naturalisation in Australia, 
became the foundation for the notorious White Australia policy, which continued 
to influence the selectivity of immigration until the early 1970s. As expected, the 
scale of migration declined and the proportion of the overseas-born in the Aus­
tralian resident population reached its lowest point in 1947 (Taylor 2016). Unlike 
the more-devolved Canadian federal structure (Ongley and Pearson 1995), the 
Australian Federal Parliament has been solely responsible for all strategic and 
policy management of immigration although, as with all nations, the domestic 
governance of human flows is partially attenuated by the country’s obligations 
and responsibilities under various international treaties and agreements. 
Australia emerged from the Second World War with a deep sense of national 
insecurity. The war demonstrated that the British Empire could not defend its 
distant outposts such as Australia. It was the United States rather than the United 
Kingdom that became the de facto guarantor of Australia’s national sovereignty 
but, to be more economically and militarily self-reliant and to reduce the country’s 
dependence on its new ‘big protector’, the nation of 7.4 million people inhabiting 
an island-continent about the size of the US had to ‘populate’ at an accelerated 
rate. Mass immigration was an obvious choice. In 1945, Australia established the 
world’s first Department of Immigration and, within the restricted scope of White 
Australia policy, embarked on its first programme of large-scale, government-
sponsored immigration (DIBP 2015).7 
This involved the acceptance of over 2 million displaced people from post­
war Europe and the subsidised arrival – under the so-called £10 assisted-passage 
scheme – of about 1 million immigrants from the UK, referred to by local wits 
as ‘£10 Poms’ (Taylor 2016).8 Many of these new immigrants were encouraged 
to work on big nation-building projects such as the Snowy Mountain Scheme 
(electricity generation), so there was little waste of the newly arriving human 
capital through long periods of involuntary unemployment. 
In 1958, the White Australia policy was partially relaxed, with the removal of 
the dictation test and the introduction of a new universal visa scheme which, in 
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principle, allowed non-Europeans to settle in Australia. The universal visa condi­
tions required potential immigrants to demonstrate their capacity to ‘contribute to 
Australia’ as well as their ability to integrate into the country’s social fabric (Tay­
lor 2016). However, the 1958 amendment notwithstanding, the White Australia 
policy continued to be administered through informal and largely arbitrary selec­
tion procedures, which favoured European immigrants and discriminated against 
putative Asian, African and Pacific settlers. Nevertheless, even though the White 
Australia policy was increasingly hard to sustain, by 1970, the Australian popula­
tion had increased to over 13 million, to which the postwar surge in immigration 
contributed over 3 million (Taylor 2016). 
The new immigrants who settled in Australia between the late 1940s and the 
early 1970s – the first wave of mass immigration – arrived at a time when contem­
porary political and intellectual debates around the question of what Australian 
identity was or what it might and should be had barely begun to surface (Goldlust 
2009). The new arrivals – or ‘migrants’, as they were described by the locals –
were expected to fit into the existing British Imperial social and institutional 
structures regardless of their particular ethnic, economic or religious background. 
However, for the vast majority of these new immigrants, Australia was a ‘prom­
ised land’ – they were accepted as equal ‘club members’ regardless of their socio­
economic or religious background. By international standards, the Australian host 
society was tolerant and ‘fair’, and it was these basic British-Australian qualities 
of inherent fairness and tolerance of diversity which, in our view, provided the 
foundation for the later policy of multiculturalism. 
Like the earlier resentment towards continuing convict transportation to Aus­
tralian colonies, the selectivity of the White Australia policy focused on the social 
rather than the human capital of potential settlers. That is, the policy was less 
concerned with the importation of skills per se and the net economic benefits asso­
ciated with the increased availability of skilled labour in Australia and focused, 
instead, on migrants’ social compatibility with earlier vintages of British-Irish 
settlers and the ethno-European balance of new arrivals. The social capital to be 
contributed by potential European immigrants was deemed to be desirable as such 
and, thus, inherently importable, while that of Asian (especially Chinese), Middle 
Eastern or African settlers was not. This was to prevent what was then perceived 
to be a potentially adverse selection of immigrants from undesirable parts of the 
world. Thus, before the 1970s, it was mostly taken for granted that the arrival of 
working-age ‘displaced persons’ from Eastern and Northern Europe, Southern 
Europeans and the £10 Poms provided nearly all that was needed in the way of 
in-bound human and social capital in order to secure the supply of skilled labour 
across the wide range of occupations demanded by the expanding and urbanising 
Australian economy. Any additional skills in short supply could be targeted spe­
cifically within the remits of the restrictive immigration strategy. 
Restrictions on the immigration of non-Europeans were relaxed in the form 
of a ministerial directive in 1966 and effectively dismantled between 1973 and 
1978, when Australia abandoned its White Australia policy and its associated dis­
criminating procedures, and adopted and rigorously applied a non-discriminatory 
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immigration regime, albeit one with more-stringent migrant entry requirements 
(PC 2016: 63–64). In particular, Australia abandoned its commitment to immigra­
tion as a target of population policy and begun to view it as a means of enhancing 
the wellbeing of the existing Australian community. In other words, the annual 
immigration intake was to be driven by the economic circumstances of the coun­
try, especially the rate of unemployment and the migrant absorptive capacity of 
the Australian community.9 Immigrants were deemed to be settlers and future 
nationals and were expected to apply offshore for entry and to arrive with valid 
entry visas. In response to the challenges posed by the influx of some 90,000 
post-Vietnam War refugees from Indochina, the humanitarian programme was 
introduced in 1977 which allowed for the protection of refugee rights (PC 2016). 
Although the family settlement stream continued to account for some 80 per cent 
of the migration programme in the early 1980s (Taylor 2016: 25), immigration 
priorities shifted from the broadly targeted immigration of people (population pol­
icy) to the importation of skills and human and social capital specifically required 
by the Australian economy under the ‘skilled migrant stream’. By the mid-2010s, 
these proportions were nearly reversed, with the family stream reduced to 25 per 
cent of the total intake. 
With the new focus on the management of human capital intake, Australia’s 
first points-based system – the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System – was 
introduced in 1979, with points allocated to applicants for permanent settlement 
on the basis of their family links to Australia and their youth, skills, command of 
the English language, literacy in the applicant’s own language and prospects for 
successful in-country integration (PC 2016). After further refinement of migration 
policies in response to various government reports (e.g. the FitzGerald Committee 
in 1988), a new migration act was introduced in 1989 that: 
•  capped the level of immigration through the points-tested components of the 
family and skilled migration streams; 
•  changed the previously fixed pass mark under the points system into a ‘float­
ing pass mark’ (to make the capped intake work); 
•  changed the conditions of transfer from temporary to permanent residency; 
•  restricted opportunities for illegal migrants to be granted permanent resi­
dency; and 
•  reduced ministerial discretion in immigration matters (PC 2016: 63–65). 
In 1992, a universal visa system was introduced under the Migration Reform 
Act 1992 (Cwlth) to regulate the entry of legal migrants and the detention and 
removal of illegals under one visa system (PC 2016). Further reforms occurred in 
the 1990s to regulate the total intake by imposing caps on the various immigra­
tion streams and adding English-language proficiency into the points test for fam­
ily immigration in order to enhance the skilled component of the family stream. 
Access to welfare benefits was also delayed, with a two-year waiting period for 
new arrivals; various procedural measures were introduced to reduce the scope for 
abuse of the different visa provisions (e.g. spouse or fiancé(e) visa entitlements). 
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In 1996, the eligibility criteria were further changed to facilitate the temporary 
labour immigration of those whose skills were needed in Australia (the so-called 
457 visa) and to add a new visa category for long-term temporary business entry 
(PC 2016). In 2008, the skill stream of the immigration programme was again 
reformed to make it more demand-oriented by increasing the proportion of tem­
porary entrants sponsored by employers and state and territory governments. In 
2012, business entry visas were changed to introduce two new types of immigrant 
entry: Business Innovation and Investment and Significant Investor visas. The stu­
dent visa programme was also simplified and the conditions of entry eased in 
order to attract a larger proportion of foreign full-fee-paying students (PC 2016). 
In the 2000s, unauthorised boat arrivals and post-9/11 international terrorist 
activities added a new emphasis on border control. This emphasis involved, inter 
alia, the reticulation of authorised migrants seeking refugee-cum-immigrant sta­
tus in Australia to offshore detention centres, such as Christmas Island, deemed 
to be partially ‘ex-territorial’ and, later, to foreign detention centres (e.g. Nauru, 
Manus Island) under the so-called Pacific Solution. 
The current migration system 
The Australian Government aims to manage immigration to benefit (increase
the wellbeing) of the existing Australian community and, given this broad goal,
it sets specific policy objectives and restrictions for each immigration stream
(DIBP 2015). As the governance of migration is a federal responsibility, the
Federal Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is vested with various
powers to cap the different visa (immigration) streams, set annual targets under
various programmes and delay or fast track different categories of applicant.
However, as temporary skilled visa streams have been uncapped and the per­
manent immigrant intake has been strongly influenced by employers and state/ 
territory governments, the Australian government’s ability to control and cap
overall migrant numbers has been limited. In this section, we review various
aspects of the current migration policy regime and the associated moral hazards
of the different policy options. 
The present merit-based migration system started to consolidate in 1996 and 
has largely been associated with the shift from traditional, permanent settler arriv­
als to temporary work and student visas. Temporary visas now outnumber perma­
nent residence visas by three to one, with over 80 per cent permanent (residence) 
visas granted on-shore to temporary migrants already in-country. In this context 
the in-country stock of temporary residents is an important policy variable, as 
permanent residents are now mostly drawn from the resident pool of temporary 
arrivals. In the late 1990s and 2000s, there was also a shift to a two-step immigra­
tion strategy, which aimed: 
•  at Step 1, to attract skilled or potentially skilled migrants to seek tempo­
rary residential status to work or study in Australia, with migrant numbers 
uncapped, lightly regulated and driven by market conditions; and 
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•  at Step 2, to induce temporary migrants with skilled employment and/or 
study experience in Australia to apply for permanent residence via the skilled 
migrant stream with annual numbers capped and more tightly regulated 
(Gregory 2014). 
Step 1 can be described as ‘for the market competition’, aimed at attracting inter­
nationally mobile human capital and young foreign talent to work and/or study in 
Australia. Step 2 can therefore be labelled ‘in the market competition’, aimed at 
retaining the ‘market-tested’ segments of the temporary resident pool before they 
flow out again as internationally mobile human capital. Thus, a defining attribute 
of the two-step immigration management framework is the pathway from tempo­
rary to permanent residency. For example, it has been estimated that over 70 per 
cent of those granted temporary 457 skilled employment visas and between 15 
and 30 per cent of student visa-holders ultimately obtain permanent residency (PC 
2016). In principle, this for-and-in-the-market-competition framework enhances 
Australia’s ability to compete in the increasingly globalised and competitive mar­
ket for internationally footloose human capital. There is also a strong focus on 
‘brain utilisation’ to prevent ’brain waste’ through demand–supply mismatches. 
Nevertheless, some moral hazards are inherent in this approach. 
Net overseas migration (NOM) is the most commonly used method for measur­
ing external migration flows into and out of Australia. In essence, it measures a 
net difference between immigration and emigration based on a duration of stay in 
or away from Australia of at least 12 months out of the preceding 16 months (PC 
2016: 66). NOM increased from about 97,000 in 1996 to peak at over 300,000 
in 2008 (at the outset of the Global Financial Crisis), to decline to 184,000 in 
2014 (PC 2016). During the 20-year period 1996–2015, the net natural increase 
of the Australian population (births minus deaths) fluctuated between 120,000 and 
160,000. Since the mid-2000s, NOM added to it more than half the annual popula­
tion increase (67 per cent in 2008). Given the two-step immigration strategy, the 
increase in NOM since the mid-2000s has largely been associated with a surge in 
temporary migration – i.e. foreign students, temporary skilled visa 457 holders 
and New Zealand citizens (PC 2016: 68). By attracting immigrants of working 
age (usually under 50), NOM delivers a demographic dividend to Australia – i.e. it 
increases the number of people in the workforce and reduces the age dependency 
ratio (of those over 65 to those aged 15–64). This is expected to reduce the impact 
of population aging. 
Permanent immigration visa grants also provide a good measure of immigrant 
input to the pool of Australia’s long-term residents and citizens as, normally, a 
large percentage of permanent visa-holders remain in-country for good and seek 
citizenship by naturalisation.10 Applications for permanent residence can be lodged 
on- and off-shore under Family, Skill and Special Eligibility streams of the Migra­
tion Programme. A separate and small Humanitarian Programme also feeds the 
stock of permanent residents. Permanent immigration under the three streams of 
the Migration Programme increased from over 82,000 in 1996 to 190,000 in 2015, 
while visas under the Humanitarian Programme fluctuated at about 15,000 a year 
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 207 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
during this period, although the number was nearly doubled in 2015 to accommo­
date an additional 12,000 Syrian refugees (PC 2016: 69). Increased immigration 
under the Migration Programme has largely been driven by skilled visa-holders 
who increased from 24,000 in 1996 to 130,000 in 2014, so the share of skilled 
permanent immigrants in the programme increased from 29 per cent in 1996 to 
68 per cent in 2014 (PC 2016: 70). Given the growth in the permanent component 
of NOM and permanent immigration visas, it can be argued that, since the mid­
1990s, Australia has experienced another wave of mass immigration. Since 2008, 
this inflow of new permanent visa-holders has also been more tuned in to labour-
market requirements as the ‘demand-driven’, employer-sponsored component of 
the skilled stream increased from 17 per cent in 2008 to 37 per cent in 2014.11 
The stock of temporary migrants, excluding tourists, stood at over 1.5 million 
in the middle of 2015 and included 653,000 New Zealand citizens on ‘temporary’
444 visas, who are free to remain in Australia to reside and work permanently 
under the Trans-Tasman travel arrangement, unless they are involved in criminal 
activities that warrant their deportation. The Trans-Tasman category of ‘tempo­
rary’ migrant is broadly similar to the ‘freely moving’ (transnational) EU citi­
zens who are entitled to reside and work in any member-country within the EU. 
Thus, the contingent of ‘temporary’ New Zealand residents in Australia should 
better be described as NZ transnational immigrants. In 2015, other temporary 
categories of migrant comprised some 375,000 foreign students, 188,000 skilled 
457 visa-holders,12 about 144,000 working holiday-makers,13 around 102,000 
bridging visa-holders,14 over 26,000 temporary graduates and more than 49,000 
otherwise-defined temporary visa-holders. Excluding New Zealand transnational 
immigrants, the stock of temporary visa-holders almost doubled between 2003 
and 2015 (PC 2016: 71). In 2013–14, student visas accounted for 40 per cent of 
temporary visas granted, holiday-makers for 33 per cent and temporary skilled 
workers (visa category 457) for 13 per cent (PC 2016). 
All permanent and temporary visa applicants have to meet a range of age, char­
acter and health requirements as well as other conditions specific to the different 
visa categories.15 Fees and immigrant visa application charges may also be set 
quite high in some cases to reduce/deter the demand for applications.16 Overall, 
however, the immigrant intakes are controlled administratively, particularly on 
the supply side, by applying the points system and quantitative caps to determine 
the immigrant flows and stocks and their composition. On the demand side, they 
are controlled by the market-mediated employer sponsorship of temporary visa-
holders and state/territory visa sponsorship. The Productivity Commission (2016) 
describes this arrangement as the ‘hybrid system’; however, only some visa 
streams have been rationed by price so that it is mostly administrative restrictions 
which have only been supplemented by the use of a price mechanism. Gener­
ally, non-price rationing is preferred as it allows administrators to target particular 
outcomes (e.g. demographic dividend) which might otherwise get diluted or lost 
if only those who have the ability to pay qualify for entry. This objection also 
applies to unauthorised migrant entry facilitated by so-called people smugglers, 
who deliver only those unauthorised migrants who have the ability to pay high 
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agent (smuggling) fees and associated travel costs. This is normally associated 
with boat arrivals targeted by Pacific Solution border controls; however, far more 
significant and difficult to handle (in Australia and many other countries) are the 
aspiring immigrants arriving on tourist visas arranged by bogus tourist agencies 
or temporary workers and students funneled into Australia by shady market inter­
mediaries to be employed by equally shady entrepreneurs as virtually ‘indentured 
labour’ (Rizvi 2019). 
In its assessment of the likely economic impact of immigration on the Austral­
ian economy, the Productivity Commission (PC 2016: 8–17) suggests that: 
•  as in several OECD countries, new immigrants have a lower employment-to­
population ratio than their Australia-born peers; 
•  an all-immigrant unemployment rate is relatively higher during recessions 
than that of Australia-born natives but about the same at other times (this is 
not surprising, as newly arrived immigrants find it harder to secure and retain 
jobs during recessions and migrant inflows are restricted by governments); 
•  permanent skilled-stream immigrants outperform those from family and 
humanitarian streams in terms of labour-force participation rates, unemploy­
ment rates, hours of work and earnings; 
•  within occupations, there is no apparent difference in earnings between those 
born overseas and Australia-born natives. Median earnings by age group 
show that the permanent skilled-stream immigrants outperform, across 
most age groups, the general population as well as family and humanitar­
ian streams. As expected, the humanitarian stream lags considerably behind 
the general population for all age groups, as many refugees arrive with little 
human capital and lack the ability to accumulate it when in-country;17 
•  while, on average, immigrants, especially those from the permanent skilled 
stream, have higher formal qualifications than their local equivalents, in 
2012–2013, about 30 per cent of ‘highly educated’ immigrants were consid­
ered to be overqualified in their current employment relative to 22 per cent 
for those Australia-born. This difference is surprisingly small though; 
•  contrary to popular myth, there is little evidence of immigrants reducing 
wage levels and displacing the incumbent workers. Such effects are usually 
confined to particular market niches (e.g. unskilled youth labour) and tend to 
be temporary. Given the great size of the Australian continent and its small 
population, population-related agglomeration economies (combining scale
and scope effects) are important sources of job growth (see also Withers 
2016). Overall, though, in line with various overseas studies, the Commission 
found a negligible effect from immigration on aggregate workforce participa­
tion, employment, wages or the propensity to invest in skills and education 
(PC 2016: 10); 
•  notwithstanding occasional claims of technological spill-in effects associated
with immigration and anecdotal evidence of immigrant entrepreneurship and
innovation, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of such activities on the
GDP level or productivity growth is limited (but see Parham and Regan 2016); 
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•  the net fiscal impact of immigration (contributions to government revenues 
less the value of government services and benefits received) is likely to be 
positive but small (2 per cent of GDP). Overall, young, skilled immigrants 
and temporary migrants generate a larger net fiscal surplus than family-
stream immigrants, while humanitarian immigrants are net beneficiaries of 
government service provision and welfare benefits; 
•  the Commission’s general equilibrium modelling of the Australian economy 
implies that Australia’s population would reach 27 million in 2060 with zero 
NOM, and the real GDP per capita would be 42 per cent above the 2014 level. 
With positive NOM at the present level, the in-country population would 
reach 40 million by 2060 and the real GDP per capita would be 50 per cent 
above the 2014 level. The projected effect is relatively small. Most studies 
indicate that, overall, immigrants ‘pay their way’ but they also capture the 
most benefits from their economic activity, especially if one allows for an 
implicit subsidy from skilled immigrants to family and humanitarian immi­
grant streams and for external effects and congestion associated with immi­
grant locational preference for the largest urban conurbations; 
•  there is also a possibility that positive NOM may increase the long-term 
growth rate of the total factor (all-input) productivity, but that the evidence 
is scant and any such effect is likely to be small, especially as the proba­
ble labour-saving effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are taken into 
consideration. However, with increased inflows of capital and technology, 
the rate of growth of labour productivity, measured, say, in GDP per person 
employed, is likely to increase; and 
•  the demographic dividend associated with the immigration of younger set­
tlers will lower the age dependency ratio and, thus, potentially moderate the 
economic pressures associated with long-term population aging. 
Some of the benefits of Australia’s immigration actually flow directly offshore 
when immigrants remit part of their earnings back to their home countries – in 
2013, remittances were estimated at AUD 7 billion at current prices and exchange 
rates (PC 2016). 
Overall, the Australian immigration system works well as it is flexible enough 
to adapt to changing domestic and international market conditions and robust 
enough to compete internationally for footloose human and social capital. It is 
also reinforced by broad support from the Australia-born public, who generally 
perceive the inflow of immigrants as welfare enhancing.18 Unsurprisingly, the pro­
jected growth in jobs and potential budget surpluses depend on future inflows of 
temporary skilled labour migrants, which may be vulnerable and unpredictable 
during economic downturns. 
The system’s success has also been attributed to the proactive policy of mul­
ticulturalism as investment in social capital to complement the accumulation 
of human capital. As noted earlier, the policy of multiculturalism encouraging 
the proactive sustainment of ethnic diversity to smooth the absorption of new 
immigrants into the host community was adopted in Australia in the early 1970s 
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following the dismantling of the overtly racist White Australia policy of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This new migration policy of the 1970s paralleled Australia’s strategic 
re-orientation towards Asia after the Vietnam War. It was also broadly endorsed 
by the then-pre-dominant group of Australians of British-Irish ethnicity who were 
generally well-disposed to newcomers from very diverse cultural backgrounds. 
The cumulative experience of the post-1945 mass immigration was also broadly 
positive (Markus 2016). 
Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki of the Australian National University – a war refu­
gee who arrived in Australia following a distinguished military service in the Pol­
ish Armed Forces and an early academic career in the United Kingdom – came to 
be regarded as the inspirational and intellectual ‘father’ of the down-under ver­
sion of multiculturalism. This meant that new immigrants did not have to hide 
their cultural baggage and could retain and cultivate their cultural and religious 
heritage. Ethnic diversity was to be embraced as a social opportunity rather than 
divested as an impediment to one’s successful integration into the host society. 
In this respect, Australian multiculturalism was also a part of the broader social 
sentiment that emerged quite spontaneously in many parts of the world in the 
late 1960s. As immigrant destination countries rebuilt and liberalised after the 
devastation of WWII, they embraced mass secondary and tertiary education, 
grew wealthier and more socially tolerant and progressively integrated into the 
rapidly globalising world economy. Greater tolerance and acceptance of social 
differences was the new Zeitgeist as baby-boomers reached adulthood. By the 
late 1970s, especially after the arrival of Vietnamese war refugees, the idea of 
multiculturalism gained social traction in Australia and the declaratory rhetoric of 
‘Australian multiculturalism’ was soon enthusiastically adopted by the Australian 
political, cultural and administrative elites. The new rhetoric was soon followed 
by new, government-funded institutions (such as ethnic councils or departments 
of multicultural affairs) as the federal and state governments pump-primed their 
bureaucracies to be more ‘inclusive’, adopted the new language of social diver­
sity, and increased budgets to facilitate the growing ethnic and cultural heteroge­
neity (e.g. multilingual assistance and ‘multicultural’ radio and television). By 
and large, Australia has been associated with successful immigrant integration if 
measured by the various economic indicators reported in this chapter and, given 
the scale of immigration and the diversity of migrant source countries, by the 
absence of striking social pathologies such as street crime. 
It was only some twenty years later that the moral hazard of the multicultural 
policy and problems associated with adverse selection by certain migrant groups 
became apparent: while the policy was broadly successful, some immigrant com­
munities set out to dismantle the institutional fabric of the all-inclusive and toler­
ant society, as it was that fabric of tolerance and acceptance that they found the 
most threatening to their parochial group identity. What was initially taken for 
granted was that the centripetal forces of social cohesion were strong enough to 
not be offset by the centrifugal forces of social diversity that were boosted by 
various multicultural initiatives. With hindsight, this assumption was rather over­
optimistic as it became clear that some groups of immigrants were only too keen 
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to retain their home-country identity and openly hostile to the idea of identifying 
with Australia as their new home. It is only recently that more stringent require­
ments have been applied to those migrant residents who seek naturalisation. They 
are now expected to demonstrate a working knowledge of the English language 
and some basic familiarity with Australia’s history and institutions. On balance, 
it is difficult to determine whether it is the proactive policy of multiculturalism 
that has been a necessary albeit an insufficient condition for Australia’s integrative 
success of large-scale immigration or whether the credit is due to the relatively 
smooth absorption of mass immigration that has occurred regardless of various 
government multicultural initiatives. The jury is out to determine whether and to 
what extent the policy of migrant integration has made much real difference in this 
respect. Other factors that have also contributed to the formation of an immigrant 
absorptive capacity are: 
•  the long-term perspective, the high degree of bipartisanship and patience 
adopted by successive political elites. Absorptive/integrative processes may 
take two or three generations to work through when there are highly diverse 
migrant intakes – a long-term focus and planning are therefore necessary; 
•  social and welfare policies that minimise resource competition between 
immigrants and Australia-born welfare recipients; 
•  accessible educational opportunities for newcomers at all levels – from sec­
ondary through tertiary to higher degrees (e.g. the availability of repayable 
student loans at the tertiary level) – to reduce competition for educational 
resources between immigrants and the Australia-born; 
•  a state/private health care system with co-payments so that immigrants do not 
burden publicly funded health care and compete against the poorer natives; 
•  a private and partially compulsory superannuation system as the basis of old-
age pensions, with state old-age pensions mostly intended to provide a social 
safety net – i.e. working age immigrants are expected to earn their old-age 
entitlements through their participation in compulsory and voluntary super­
annuation funds; 
•  steady long-term wage/salary growth, which has reduced competition 
between immigrants and the Australia-born by minimising potential displace­
ment effects; 
•  no military conscription, which otherwise might have created tension 
between those drafted into national service and those staying behind (often 
non-nationals); and 
•  the effective policing of Australian borders, which has helped to sustain public
support for controlled immigration. There appears to be strong public antipathy
towards unauthorised immigrants who try to jump the queue or get in under the
fence as visa overstayers or bogus refugees (however, this is also resented by a
large part of the Australian public – see remaining sections of this chapter). 
The present model of immigration emphasises a market-driven focus on per­
manent and temporary skilled migration with pathways to permanent residency. 
212 Stefan Markowski et al. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, it aims to attract a large influx of fee-paying foreign students by offer­
ing a pathway to residency to retain much of the newly formed human capital in-
country. The integrity and effectiveness of this approach depends on the efficient 
and flexible administration of migrant selection using the meritocratic points sys­
tem which, in turn, depends on the effective system of border control that allows 
policy-makers to determine who comes to Australia as an immigrant, when and 
on what terms. It is also the strength of economic pull factors that is expected 
to provide the social bonding needed to underpin the successful integration of 
new arrivals into the existing social fabric of Australia. However, like all policy 
initiatives, the present economics-driven migration model creates its own moral 
hazards of unintended and sometimes perverse consequences and, thus, associ­
ated policy dilemmas. 
First, the so-called Pacific Solution19 has been effective in preventing Australia 
from being inundated with unauthorised mass arrivals. This is the dilemma faced 
by all developed countries, particularly the European Union and the US, where a 
large number of de facto labour migrants seek asylum on humanitarian grounds to 
gain entry as refugees.20 However, the Pacific Solution has attracted a great deal 
of international opprobrium as Australia’s external obligations under the inter­
national system of migration governance (see the next section) tend to conflict 
with the full sovereignty of border control needed by the meritocratic system of 
human capital preferment. There is no easy way out of this dilemma, even if Aus­
tralia opted out of its international treaty obligations. The influx of unauthorised 
immigrants is only deterred by the randomness of the reticulation system and 
the harshness and ruthlessness of the Pacific Solution.21 In turn, this sits rather 
uncomfortably with the Australian national psyche and its profound sense of fair­
ness and ‘fair go’ for the underdog. Many Australians believe that the system of 
international migration governance should not be fundamentally different from its 
domestic counterpart, which aims to equalise opportunities for all citizens regard­
less of the geographic and social incidence of their birth. Thus, many Austral­
ians believe that unauthorised immigrants have an unalienable human right to 
settle in Australia as their preferred location, which should not be attenuated by 
the Westphalian concept of national sovereignty that restricts such rights to those 
entry-seekers who are authorised to settle on terms determined by the incumbents 
(Howe 2016). However, at the same time, opinion polls and elections results show 
that the majority of Australians approve of the Pacific Solution as a means of 
border control and an effective deterrent of mass unauthorised migrant arrivals. 
There is an element of contradiction22 in these conflicting social sentiments and, 
not surprisingly, the Pacific Solution has polarised Australian politics since its 
introduction in the early 2000s.23 
Second, the market-oriented approach to the management of skilled permanent 
and temporary migration pertains to the partial delegation of the administration 
of migrant selection to employers and state/territory governments. Under the cur­
rent system, the Australian government uses market labour analysis and a public 
consultative process to compile the Consolidated Sponsored Occupations List
(in 2016, CSOL comprised 649 occupations) and the Skilled Occupations List
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 213 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(SOL, listing 191 occupations deemed to be in short supply) in a bid to guide 
the assessment of immigrant applications in employer-sponsored and independ­
ent points-tested categories respectively. As the Productivity Commission notes, 
the classification of occupations as skilled tends to be quite arbitrary and ‘there 
is a strong case to move to a universal points system for the entire permanent 
skill stream – similar to the approach adopted in Canada [and] in doing so, it 
would deliberately raise the standard across the entire cohort of permanent skilled 
migrants and generate better economic and social outcomes’ (PC 2016: 24–25). 
The actual application of the applicant sponsorship effectively shifts a large part 
of the selection process to those who have ‘vested interests in unduly influencing 
outcomes’ – i.e. shady employers, market intermediaries and local politicians (PC 
2016: 24–25). This applied in particular to the uncapped stream of temporary 457 
visa-holders, where conditions imposed on sponsoring organisations to demon­
strate the necessity to attract temporary foreign workers due to market skill short­
ages were often very laxed (Howe 2016). There is plenty of scope for the system to 
be ‘gamed’ by employers, market agents and ‘ethnic network’ operators and, thus, 
for some temporary foreign workers to be exploited by unscrupulous employers 
and market agents (see Rizvi 2019). For example, unskilled migrants may be fun­
neled into the country providing that they comply with some bogus or vague skill 
requirements. Not surprisingly, there has been pressure to tighten these tempo­
rary arrangements. Temporary visas are also opposed by unions which resist the 
fragmentation of the labour market and the resultant erosion of their membership 
and bargaining power. In 2017–18, Australian Government started to implement 
a number of changes to temporary and permanent skilled-migration programmes, 
including the 457 temporary-visa programme.24 There are also plans to contract 
out to the private sector some elements of migrant administration. This may easily 
backfire and add to tensions reported by Rizvi (2019) and Mares (2019). 
Third, the effectiveness of the system of international student visas as a path 
to permanent immigration has also been questioned (see Boucher 2016). In prin­
ciple, this allows talented international students from poor backgrounds to work 
and study in order to fund their education.25 Visa numbers are uncapped and these 
temporary visa-holders have a right to work for up to 40 hours per fortnight dur­
ing semester time and unlimited hours at other times. The temporary graduate 
visa-holders have a right to work for between 18 and 48 months after graduation. 
A very high proportion of foreign students avail themselves of these work oppor­
tunities.26 Those who opt to remain in Australia, possibly up to a third of the stock, 
are effectively self-funding the formation of human capital, which will remain in 
country. However, the obvious moral hazard of this arrangement is that the sys­
tem can be gamed by unscrupulous educational agents and service-providers to 
import bogus students, who pay educational fees for a right to work as unskilled 
workers in Australia. As critics point out, ‘It’s a relationship that involves the gov­
ernment effectively contracting out a big chunk of the migration program to self-
serving educational institutions that elect to ignore the costs of the program while 
scooping up many of the benefits’ (Sloan 2019a: 22). The obvious social oppor­
tunity cost of the programme pertains to the lowering of educational standards by 
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educational providers to target low-quality entrants, especially those with limited 
English-language skills, who would not normally meet admission requirements 
(Rizvi 2019; Sloan 2019b). However, to date, there has been no comprehensive 
cost – benefit analysis of the education sector as an exporter of Australia-based 
services. 
Fourth, the unrestricted, market-oriented approach mostly funnels the new arriv­
als into the two major Australian conurbations: Sydney and Melbourne (Taylor
2016). This is where immigrant communities agglomerate and, thus, benefit from
strong agglomeration economies, but where infrastructural congestion (e.g. roads,
public transport) and other negative externalities experienced by the incumbents
(e.g. access to housing, primary schools etc.) may offset the benefits associated with
the arrival of new skilled immigrants. Most foreign students live and study in major
cities, in particular Sydney and Melbourne (Sloan 2019a). Clearly, such location-
specific issues should easily be addressed under the meritocratic points system by
assigning higher points to those visa applicants who commit to living in designated
areas. However, this needs to be contractually enforced and, under the present sys­
tem, those contracts implicit in entry visas are highly incomplete. Once in-country,
immigrants are practically free to settle where they wish even if they had previously
committed to residing at a particular location.27 Again, under the two-step system of
entry regulation this should be easily remedied by making the pathway to perma­
nent arrangements conditional on compliance with initial visa settings or by making
subsequent naturalisation opportunities dependent on immigrant compliance with
their earlier visa conditions. This remains to be implemented. 
Fifth, the pathway to permanent residence has been formally reinforced by the 
policy of multiculturalism, which is intended to lower the absorption cost of the 
increasingly more socially and culturally diverse influx of immigrants. This is 
claimed to have worked well in Australia (Pakulski 2014), although the obvi­
ous moral hazard of encouraging high levels of ethnic and cultural diversity is 
the potential for increased social fragmentation and identity grouping, which per­
versely increase the social opportunity cost of immigrant integration. 
All in all, the Australian migration system is largely geared to labour-market 
outcomes. Migrants account for a significant proportion of net population change 
but they are largely pre-selected as skilled people of working age. In this respect, 
challenges posed by migrant integration are secondary. Temporary migrant work­
ers and students are essentially foreigners allowed to stay in-country. It is intended 
that a significant proportion of them will opt to remain in Australia and will seek 
permanent Australian residency. It is at this point that they will be expected to 
integrate into the host society. Nevertheless, to obtain residency status they are 
first screened and assessed as potential Australians, so the migration policy paves 
the way to the migrant integration policy. Once accepted as permanent residents 
of Australia, immigrants are free to access state and federal public goods and 
services (e.g. the Medicare system, education, public housing) on the same basis 
as regular Australian citizens. They are also encouraged to naturalise and become 
Australian citizens. Given the in-country presence of large ethnic groups, many 
new migrants are also integrated through established ethnic channels. 
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Regional migration governance 
Finally, Australian migration strategies, policies and procedures should also be 
seen in the broader context of Australia’s participation in the international and 
regional governance of cross-border mobility. The UN defines international 
migration governance as ‘the [totality of] migration policies and programmes of 
individual countries, inter-state discussions and agreements, multilateral forums 
and consultative processes, the activities of international organisations, as well as 
relevant laws and norms’ (Chand and Markowski 2018: 2). Under this definition, 
the migration governance activities of sovereign nation-states account for the bulk 
of international migration governance as the sovereign Westphalian nation-state 
that is the basic building block and juridical territorial entity of the international 
legal order. It is therefore the nation-state which is recognised by other nation-
states as the sovereign legal entity vested with the unchallengeable authority to 
govern its internal affairs, represent its territory and its inhabitants in relations 
with other nation-states, control the way they interact with other countries and, if 
need be, use force to protect its territorial integrity. However, some of that sov­
ereignty is surrendered when a nation-state federates or clubs with other states 
to form a supranational entity, such as the EU, or when it becomes a signatory to 
bi- and multilateral treaties and agreements that attenuate its freedom to act as a 
fully sovereign nation. 
Accordingly, Australia is a signatory to multilateral treaties, usually UN-
mediated, such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Interna­
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment or 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In their totality, these international obli­
gations restrict Australia’s ability to defend its borders. All unauthorised immi­
grants landing on its shores can claim protection as refugees and asylum-seekers 
and, thus, are entitled to, at least, a formal review of their claims, temporary stay 
and shelter pending the outcome of screening and, if need be, appeal processes. 
Given the inherent inequalities between nation-states, a vast segment of humanity 
could claim asylum rights in prosperous democracies such as Australia. As noted 
earlier, the unauthorised arrivals of migrants from poor, oppressive and violent 
parts of the world can only be deterred by very harsh border control measures. 
For many, including a large part of the Australian electorate, the application of 
such harsh measures contravenes not only the spirit but also the letter of interna­
tional treaties and agreements, which have idealistically sought to provide refugee 
protection in exceptional circumstances. However, these treaties have also been 
used by all those who refuse to have their cross-border mobility constrained by 
the accident of their birth and who seek to improve their life chances of living a 
reasonably secure and prosperous existence, normally taken for granted by inhab­
itants of rich democracies such as Australia. 
The emergence of nation-states from the post-First World War ruins of old 
empires has also elevated the importance of international free trade and the 
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unimpeded mobility of factors of production such as capital and labour. As global 
free trade and factor mobility have been difficult to secure, federal states such 
as the US, Canada or Australia and regional, quasi-federal economic clubs such 
the European Union have provided a means of securing regional agglomeration 
economies. Most of these entities have been structured as Buchanan-style, top-
down economic clubs (Buchanan 1965), that is, as centrally managed entities that 
have been designed for geographically contiguous member-states operating as 
provinces or states. The federation of the former British colonies into the Com­
monwealth of Australia is an example of such an arrangement. However, this is 
geographically limited to the Australian continent and its offshore islands. In the 
vastness of the Pacific region, the federal model cannot be easily extended to 
include relatively small island-states dispersed over huge ocean areas. One model 
is to incorporate an archipelago such as Hawaii as an offshore state of the US. 
Another has been based on the special relationship between Australia and New 
Zealand, which Chand and Markowski (2018) describe as a self-regulating and 
relatively unstructured club – an alternative to the Buchanan-style arrangement –
and label an idiorhythmic economic club. 
The structured, top-down architecture of Buchanan-style clubs such as the EU 
experience a lot of friction as their Westphalian member-states find it challenging 
to surrender their national sovereignty to form working coalitions of members 
driven by some high-level vision of an ever-closer federal entity. In contrast, idio­
rhythmic economic clubs grow organically and bottom-up (through a series of 
new inter-state initiatives and partial reversals), using self-regulating management 
structures (e.g. regional coordination committees) that rely on weak, often dis­
cordant bonding mechanisms and makeshift forms of club governance as opposed 
to the overarching central design. An example of such an emergent design is the 
Australia – New Zealand Pacific (ANZPAC) migration governance system. 
The outer boundary of the ANZPAC is provided by the Pacific Island Forum
(PIF), which is the weak bonding force of this regional arrangement. The two 
largest and economically strongest nation-states within the ANZPAC system are 
Australia and New Zealand, with their dependent territories. Both Australia and 
New Zealand are immigrant destinations for inter-regional migrants that have 
long been integrated through the Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) and the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrange­
ment. The latter has provided the legal basis for the free mobility of workers and 
residents between Australia and New Zealand with largely unrestricted residen­
tial and employment rights. As Australia has been the larger and wealthier of the 
two foundation states of the ANZPAC, the New Zealand diaspora in Australia 
numbers well over 600,000 or more than 9 per cent of all foreign-born residents 
(Taylor 2016: 17). There are some non-reciprocal residential and labour-flow 
arrangements between New Zealand, the Cook Islands and Niue, which allow 
nationals of these island-states to emigrate to New Zealand (but not the reverse). 
Most of the island-states in the Pacific are very poor and vulnerable. Temporary 
employment in Australia and New Zealand provides the most effective economic 
aid for Pacific Island economies (Berkelmans and Pryke 2016). In principle, 
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
temporary workers from the Pacific Islands could have been employed in Australia 
under the uncapped 457 visa arrangements and in New Zealand under a similar 
but capped employer nomination scheme. However, the mainstream immigration 
strategies and policies of Australia and New Zealand are aimed at attracting skilled 
workers and human capital and the mostly unskilled Pacific-Island workers are 
unlikely to qualify. Thus, both Australia and New Zealand have separate seasonal 
worker programmes which aim to support economies of the neighbouring Pacific 
nations by offering limited seasonal work as a form of development assistance. 
In Australia, this is provided through the Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) and 
in New Zealand through the Recognised Employer Program (RSEP). It is these 
arrangements, together with the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, that form the 
basis of the ANZPAC migration system (Chand and Markowski 2018). 
While still largely embryonic, the concept of the ANZPAC as a self-regulating, 
bottom-up and idiorhythmic migration system provides some food for thought for 
countries seeking an alternative to Buchanan-style clubbing arrangements. This 
could be of interest to the post-Brexit United Kingdom as it will have to retain its 
united (federal) structure but also allow for flexible factor-flow arrangements with 
other states under free-trade agreements and limited market integration. 
Concluding comment 
In this chapter we have reviewed the history of Australian migration governance 
to highlight those aspects that should be of interest for EU member-states and the 
EU as a whole. This applies in particular to the enhanced understanding of the 
moral hazards that are inevitably associated with all migration strategies, policies 
and procedures. We also tried to emphasise that Australia is primarily a country 
of labour immigration. The system of immigrant selection mitigates against the 
acceptance of immigrants as such. Unlike the US, Australia does not aspire to 
attract the ‘huddled masses of humanity’. The most obvious exceptions from the 
country’s labour-oriented immigration policy are refugees under the humanitarian 
migrant intake and family members of accepted labour immigrants. 
There are obvious limits to the portability of the Australian immigration experi­
ence. Ultimately, every country is unique and its particular experience is a product 
of many country-specific factors. There is, however, one strong element of simi­
larity. Over the past few decades, Europe as a region has evolved from a source 
of mass emigration to become the highly desirable destination for mass immi­
gration. It shares some similarities with Australia, which has been an immigrant 
destination for most of its modern history. Like Australia, but on a substantially 
greater scale, the European Union is confronted with pressures posed by the mass 
immigration of working-age people from poor countries who seek a better life in 
richer parts of the world. The benefits of these migrants for destination countries 
have been well documented (see, for example, PC 2016) and the experience of 
such inflows is broadly positive. It is the scale of the phenomenon and the rate 
of arrivals that are now posing problems for migrant destinations. Most of these 
destinations are democracies which face populist resistance to mass immigration 
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from various sections of the electorate, even if the inflow of migrants is broadly 
beneficial for the country as a whole. These populist movements are now signifi­
cant enough to threaten the political stability of EU member-states. Thus, there is 
pressure to regulate mass migratory movements or they may otherwise destabilise 
the very social and economic fabric of wealthy democracies that has made them 
attractive as migrant destinations in the first place. 
In this context, the Australian experience is instructive for three reasons. First, 
in Australia, unlike the European Union, there is a strong, bi-partisan political con­
sensus that immigration is good for the country as a source of substantial demo­
graphic, cultural and economic dividend. There is also a political consensus that 
inflows of people have to be regulated to deliver this dividend. It is the mechan­
ics of regulation where political interests diverge, often substantially. However, 
in a working democracy, the mechanics of regulation are the prerogative of the 
government of the day. In federal Australia, the responsibility for migration con­
trol is vested in the federal government. This is where the European Union is 
confronting an institutional ambiguity that has to be addressed sooner rather than 
later. Either responsibility for the regulation of cross-border migration has to be 
unambiguously assigned to the Union as a quasi-federal entity or it has to revert 
back to member-states, in which case the very concept of the EU as an ‘ever closer 
union’ is in doubt. 
Second, to make the (cross-border) migration and subsequent migrant integra­
tion policies work, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the decision-making 
entity have to be protected. This is the logic of the Australian Pacific Solution, 
where harsh border controls are enforced to stop the massive inflow of unauthor­
ised immigrants. This stringent implementation allows Australia to determine the 
scale and scope of migrant inflows and secure public support for regulated mass 
immigration. It is this capacity to enforce border controls that the EU lacks at 
present and, in its absence, member-states are encouraged to deflect unwanted 
migrant inflows to other parts of the Union and free ride at the expense of the 
Community. In the longer term, this also threatens the integrity of intra-EU free 
movement and the Schengen system of unimpeded intra-EU mobility. We do not 
wish to suggest that the potential Mediterranean Solution should be modelled on 
the Pacific one. Clearly, there is plenty of room for innovation and the EU as a 
whole has much larger resources at its disposal and much greater economic lever­
age to find a way of regaining border control that could avoid the harshness of the 
Pacific Solution. Nevertheless, some radical initiative is in order if the European 
project is to regain its momentum and appeal.28 
Third, the Australian regional experience is also of value. For far too long, Aus­
tralia and New Zealand have neglected the plight of Pacific Islanders and their
dependence on the Australian and New Zealand labour markets. Admittedly, their
numbers are small so there has never been a threat of mass migration from the
Pacific. However, a wealthy country like Australia should accept some responsibil­
ity for its less fortunate neighbours and provide well-targeted economic assistance
to lift people out of poverty. The schemes presently operated by Australia and New
Zealand are far from adequate but do represent a step in the right direction. The EU
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faces a much more demanding task in its African and Middle Eastern neighbour­
hoods. If massive flows of unauthorised labour migrants are to be brought under
control, the EU must confront the sources and causes of recurrent mass emigration.
There are many potential solutions that would inevitably involve substantial invest­
ment of European resources at the expense of current programmes of intra-EU assis­
tance for new member-states. However, the potentially destabilising mass migration
cannot only be regulated by means of border controls; economic capacity-building
in source countries is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition for the effective
management of mass inflows of job-seekers. 
Australia is also quite unambiguous with regard to the ultimate objectives of 
its immigration system. While it serves as a backdoor population policy, it is pri­
marily an instrument for attracting inflows of skilled and relatively young labour 
migrants. The EU should similarly be more explicit as to why it wants to attract 
migrants as opposed to stopping the unauthorised job-seekers at its border. The 
policy of migrant integration is a secondary challenge. Unlike economically moti­
vated immigration where quantitative policy targets could be specified, this is 
an area where it is easy to claim integrative success as well as to criticise the 
outcomes. Much of it is, in our opinion, a declaratory rhetoric of different vested 
interests. The main lesson, however, is that migration strategies and policies have 
to be designed with greater understanding and acceptance of the inevitable moral 
hazards of different policy initiatives. It is not that Australia has adopted a wiser 
and more anticipatory approach but it has learnt much faster from its mistakes and 
its strategic agility makes it more politically resilient, bipartisan and effective at 
addressing problems of mass, cross-border mobility as they emerge.29 
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Notes 
1 The Migration Council Australia (MCA) is an independent, non-partisan, not-for­
profit body established to enhance the productive benefits of Australia’s migration and 
humanitarian programmes. It aims to enhance understanding of migration and settle­
ment processes in Australia through commissioned migration-related research and to 
foster the development of migration-focused partnerships between the Australian cor­
porate sector, the community and the government. 
2 Some Chinese labourers came to Australia during the Gold Rush of the 1850s but their 
arrivals were soon restricted under colonial legislation such as the Victoria’s Immigra­
tion Act 1855 (Vic) (PC 2016). 
3 In Tasmania, for example, there were two convicts for every free settler (Creighton 2019). 
4 By 1850, the NSW Legislative Council received 36,000 signatures opposing further 
convict transportation and only 525 in favour of it (Creighton 2019). 
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5 Arguably, an antipodean rehash of the centuries-old antagonism between the pre­
dominantly Catholic Ireland and the predominantly Protestant Great Britain (Goldlust 
2009). 
6 Inevitably, absurdities followed. For example, a Czech national was set a dictation 
test in Scottish Gaelic while an illegal Japanese immigrant was administered a test in 
Greek (PC 2016). 
7 It targeted the annual population growth of 2 per cent of which half was to result from 
the immigration of new settlers. The settler intake was to be ‘balanced between assisted 
and non-assisted immigrants, British and non-British immigrants, and between north­
ern and southern Europeans within the non-British intake’ (DIMA 2001: 4). 
8 The term ‘Pom’ in Australia usually denotes an English person (or, less commonly, a 
person from another part of the UK). 
9 As the economy stagnated in the early 1970s, the overall migrant intake was capped 
(e.g. at 50,000 people in 1975). 
10 Of the 7 million immigrants who have settled in Australia since 1945, over 60 per cent 
have become Australian citizens (PC 2016: 4). 
11 State- and territory-sponsored visas under the points-tested skill stream also increased 
sixfold between 2005 and 2014. Business Innovation and Investment visas have 
remained a small component of the stream and the so-called Distinguish Talent com­
ponent is negligible (PC 2016). 
12 These have to be nominated under one of the targeted occupations listed on the Consol­
idated Sponsored Occupations Lists. Sponsors of 457 visas must also meet minimum 
annual salary requirements of AUD 53,900 plus superannuation. 
13 These are temporary holiday-makers-cum-seasonal workers aged 18–30 years who are 
allowed to stay and work for up to two years under bilateral arrangements with a num­
ber of countries. They provide a pool of unskilled labour services but this appears to 
be working well, with the programme both offering the holiday experience and chan­
neling unskilled labour to agricultural jobs in rural areas. 
14 Allowed to remain in Australia pending the outcome of a substantive visa application. 
15 For example, permanent family-stream visas require applicants to be related to an Aus­
tralian permanent resident, a citizen or a New Zealand citizen while skill-stream immi­
grants should normally be under 50 years of age. Applicants under the investor stream 
must buy state/territory assets worth at least AUD 1.5 million and must be nominated 
by the state/territory concerned, while the fast-tracked premium-investor visa may be 
granted to those who acquire assets worth at least AUD 15 million in asset categories 
chosen by the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (PC 2016). 
16 For example, eligible Australian residents can sponsor parents to join them in Australia 
through a noncontributory stream – with application charges of AUD 7,000 per appli­
cant and a waiting period of up to 30 years – or a contributory stream where the charge 
per applicant may exceed AUD 47,000 but the waiting period is reduced to up to two 
years (PC 2016: 77). 
17 For example, of the 70,000 immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa who 
arrived between 2006 and 2015 as mostly humanitarian refugees, the 2016 census 
shows that 44,000 were either unemployed or looking for work in 2016. This com­
pares with 31,000 mostly skilled and family-stream arrivals from Southern and Eastern 
Europe of whom only 3,900 were in the same category (Creighton 2019). 
18 For example, in 2016, the Lowy Institute in Sydney found that over 70 per cent of its 
survey respondents agreed that, overall, immigration had a positive impact on Aus­
tralia and that the absorption of immigrants from many countries makes Australia 
stronger. Only 35 per cent of respondents opined that immigrants take away jobs from 
other Australians (Berkelmans and Pryke 2016). 
19 Whereby unauthorised immigrants  – usually funneled into the Australian territorial
waters in boatloads by black/grey market agents (often described as ‘people smug­
glers’) to claim, on arrival, refugee and asylum-seeker status – are reticulated to off­
shore detention centres in the Pacific region (e.g. Nauru or Papua New Guinea Manus
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Island). The UNHCR-determined ‘genuine refugees’ are resettled in Australia but others
are left behind to deter further inflows. Migrant-swapping mechanisms are also agreed
with Canada, New Zealand and the US to increase the randomness of the final settlement
destination – thus to deter people smugglers from targeting specific destination countries. 
20 Given the present wording of international treaties and agreements governing such 
matters, most of those claiming asylum come from source countries which are defined 
not only as poor but also as politically and socially highly illiberal so that claims of 
oppression and human rights abuse can easily be sustained. 
21 Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of the deterrence factor is either misunderstood or 
deliberately undervalued by the critics of the Pacific Solution (Gordon 2017). 
22 Inevitably, in democracies such as Australia, migration strategies are formed by 
national political elites and as such reflect the prevailing elite consensus. However, 
as pointed out by Withers (2016), the Australian public’s perceptions of immigration 
and immigrants are more influenced by opinion-makers (e.g. media personalities) than 
by experts – hence the oft-observed lack of transitivity between the different public 
strands of opinion as reflected in the various polls. 
23 The Australian Labor Party, which previously championed the relaxation of strict bor­
der controls, was severely beaten in the 2013 election that was fought largely on the 
issue of border control following the unauthorised arrival of 51,000 asylum-seekers 
in 800 boats and the deaths at sea, Mediterranean-style, of 1,200 people (Creighton 
2019). It also lost the ‘unlosable’ federal election in 2019, which was also fought on 
issues related to border control. Prior to the election, the Independents-controlled fed­
eral parliament passed the so-called medivac bill, which was to facilitate the imme­
diate evacuation on ‘medical grounds’ of the vast majority of unauthorised refugees 
and asylum-seekers from Nauru and their eventual resettlement on the Australian 
continent. It was feared that the medivac policy, supported by the-then Labor opposi­
tion, would trigger another wave of boat arrivals. Not surprisingly, the threat of the 
Mediterranean-style refugee scenario allowed the incumbent Coalition government to 
use it as a major part of their re-election platform. 
24 The changes result in a shorter list of occupations eligible for skilled migration visas 
and the introduction of a new Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa (https://immi. 
homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/temporary-skill-shortage-482).
The new visa conditions include tightened English language requirements, a mini­
mum two-year work experience, stricter visa renewal procedures and a requirement 
that sponsoring employers pay the going market wage rate. 
25 In 2017, international students studying and living in Australia contributed AUD 
30.3 billion to the Australian economy, making the educational industry the country’s 
third largest export sector and its leading service export sector (The Australian 27 Feb­
ruary 2019: 29). 
26 For example, the 2016 population census showed that 51 per cent of foreign students 
were in the labour force (i.e. either working or looking for work). Those who worked 
while studying were employed as cleaners and laundry workers, sales assistants, food 
preparation assistants, food-sector workers, carers and aides, road and rail drivers, 
sales support workers and factory process workers. Only in tenth place were ‘educa­
tional professionals’ – i.e. students employed as teaching and research assistants (The 
Australian 20 February 2019). 
27 Similarly, students can change their declared courses to reduce their academic work­
loads and fees and seek market-mediated employment opportunities. 
28 The lessons of Brexit should not go amiss in this respect, as the key ‘red line’ drawn 
by Mrs. Theresa May, the-then British Prime Minister, and her Brexit negotiating team 
related to the free movement of people. 
29 An example of this is the immediate post-2019 Federal election response of the opposi­
tion Australian Labor Party, which has set out to examine the implementation of gov­
ernment migration policy and the workings of federal administration machinery tasked 
with policy implementation (Rizvi 2019). 
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